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CRYPTANALYSIS OF MERKLE-HELLMAN CIPHER
USING PARALLEL GENETIC ALGORITHM
KANTOUR NEDJMEDDINE AND BOUROUBI SADEK
Abstract. In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman introduced
the public key cryptography or asymmetric cryptography standards.
Two years later, an asymmetric cryptosystem was published by Ralph
Merkle and Martin Hellman called MH, based on a variant of knap-
sack problem known as the subset-sum problem which is proven to be
NP-hard. Furthermore, over the last four decades, Metaheuristics have
achieved a remarkable progress in solving NP-hard optimization prob-
lems. However, the conception of these methods raises several chal-
lenges, mainly the adaptation and the parameters setting. In this paper,
we propose a Parallel Genetic Algorithm (PGA) adapted to explore ef-
fectively the search space of considerable size in order to break the MH
cipher. Experimental study is included, showing the performance of the
proposed attacking scheme and finally concluding with a comparison
with the LLL algorithm attack.
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Keywords and phrases. Cryptanalysis, Merkle-Hellman Cryptosys-
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1. Introduction
The Merkle-Hellman Cipher has been a subject to several attacks (see [6],
[7], [8], [9] and [19]) namely the one proposed by A. Shamir in 1982 revealing
some flaws in the reconstruction of the super-increasing sequence from the
trapdoor sequence [6], nevertheless, this attack is only suitable under certain
circumstances. Furthermore, there are also heuristic based attacks (Genetic
Algorithm, LLL Algorithm, . . . ), the common factor among these proposed
heuristic approaches is that they all proceed one block at a time attack.
Thus, since the aim is to solve multiple knapsack problems renowned NP-
hard, these approaches can be too expensive, to this point, according to our
state of the art, no experimental results has been published demonstrating
the performances and limits of these latter. In this paper we present a
parallel heuristic approach using a Genetic Algorithm to decrypt a ciphered
information in full.
2. Merkle-Hellman cipher
The Merkle-Hellman Cipher is one of the first asymmetric cryptosystems
proposed in 1978 based on the knapsack problem, although this problem is
proven to be NP-hard [3]. However, there exists some instances where it
can be solved in a linear time, as in the case of super-increasing sequence.
Therefore, Merkle and Hellman proposed an arithmetical transformation
This work was supported by LIFORCE Laboratory of USTHB University.
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ensuring the transition form a trivial knapsack based on super-increasing
sequence to a hard one, identified as a trapdoor sequence. In breif, this
cryptosystem uses a trivial knapsack problem which serves as a private key,
and then transforms it to a general knapsack problem serving as a public
key [1]. These keys are generated thusly:
The private key consists of a super-increasing sequence {a1, a2, . . . , an}, an
integer m with m >
∑n
i=1 ai, an integer w ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} which is prime
with m, and a permutation δ of the set {1, . . . , n}; hence, the public key
is deduced from the private key by calculating bi = aδ(i)w [m], for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let M = m1m2 . . . mk be a plain information written in
binary (ASCII code), where mi = x
i
1x
i
2 . . . x
i
n, x
i
j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
and let C = (c1, c2, . . . , ck) be the correspondent ciphered information, with
ci =
∑n
j=1 bjx
i
j, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}; to decrypt C we proceed as follows, cal-
culating Di = w
−1ci [m], ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, secondly, we solve the triv-
ial knapsack Di =
∑n
j=1 aje
i
j , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, finaly, deducing x
i
j from
xij = e
i
δ(j), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
3. Cryptanalytic process
We want to carry out an attack on a ciphered information C = (c1, c2, . . . , ck)
with the aim of finding the correspondent clear information, this amounts to
uncovering the information M⋆ = m⋆1m
⋆
2 . . . m
⋆
k, m
⋆
i = x
⋆i
1 x
⋆i
2 . . . x
⋆i
n , x
⋆i
j ∈
{0, 1}, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ensuring :
ci −
n∑
j=1
bj x
⋆i
j = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
where {b1, b2, . . . , bn} is the public key.
Therefore, we associate the mathematical model (P) where the plain infor-
mation M⋆ represent its optimal solution, this model is well known as the
Multiple Knapsack Problem.
(P)


M in (Z) =
k∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
bjx
i
j,
n∑
j=1
bj x
i
j ≥ ci, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Intending to construct a flexible mathematical model, and considering
the fact that only the optimal solution breaks the ciphered information (the
best or nothing situation), for each bloc i we associate a cryptanalysis model
(Pi) to each ciphered block i where its optimal solution is m⋆i , moreover, we
can rely on the following model while it retains the same objective values:
(Pi)


M in(Z) = |ci −
n∑
j=1
bjx
i
j|,
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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To find the original information we are required to solve numerous NP-
hard problems (Pi)1<i≤k, thus, we propose an attacking scheme that mainly
uses multiple genetic algorithms in a parallel way, in which they are enhanced
with distinctive search and communication strategies.
4. Genetic Algorithm
Genetic algorithms have been developed by John Holland in 1975, pre-
sented in his book Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems [12], which
roughly, are optimization algorithms inspired from natural evolution mech-
anisms and genetic science, the main proposed idea was to combine the
principle ”survival of the fittest” among string structures with a deliberated
random information exchange [10]; initiated with a set of chromosomes (i.e
potential solutions) called initial population, this algorithm uses ”natural
selection” along with genetics-inspired operators (crossover, mutation and
selection) to move from one population to a new population [11], hence,
reducing the search procedure among exponential-ordered search space to a
collection of candidate solutions incrementally adapted, regarding the adap-
tation measurement, a fitness function is defined to evaluate chromosomes
according to their performance against a given problem. In the rest of this
section we present an adaptation of the genetic algorithm with slight modifi-
cations to solve the knapsack problem (Pi) defined above. Starting with the
representation of the chromosomes mi (i.e solutions of the problem (Pi)), we
have chosen to use a natural representation so as a chromosome is a binary
string, thus, mi = x
i
1x
i
2 . . . x
i
n, x
i
j ∈ {0, 1}, where n is the public key length.
To initiate the algorithm we need to generate an initial population, for that,
we used a greedy heuristic that generates randomly a large set of chromo-
somes and then retains a given number of best fitted ones, so as to provide a
set of chromosomes of ”acceptable” quality; when entring the algorithm, we
randomly select parents form the current population according to a mating
probability (called also crossover probability) Pc , the selected chromosomes
are in charge of producing the next population. For that purpose, we con-
duct three operations : crossover, mutation and selection. The crossover
operator is defined in genetic algorithms as an analogy of the mecanism
that allows the reproduction of chromosomes in nature, where the produced
chromosomes partially heretates caracteristics from its parents with copying
and recombinnig their genes in a delaberated way. For the mating process
we used three crossover operators proceeding for each pair, first, we use a
very classical operator, choosing a cutting point, say c ∈ {2, . . . , n−1}, here
the mating process consists of swapping bits c+1 to r of the first parent P1
with bits c+1 to r of the second parent P2 [7], hence, new chromosomes C1
and C2 are created.
P1 = 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 −→ C1 = 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
swap l
P2 = 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 −→ C2 = 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
Figure 1. One cutting point crossover operator.
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The second operator is similar to the first one but here we use tow cutting
points, and new chromosomes are generated swapping the middle parts of
the parents, as it shown in Figure 2.
P1 = 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 −→ C1 = 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
swap l
P2 = 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 −→ C2 = 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Figure 2. Two cutting point crossover operator.
The third operator constructs one child chromosome C by alternately choos-
ing random genes from the parents (see Figure 3), this operator is known as
the uniform crossover operator.
P1 = 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
P2 = 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
}
→ C = 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
Figure 3. Uniform crossover operator.
The newly produced chromosomes are added to the current population,
where at this point, we perform mutation according to a probability pm,
here, its value is usually chosen less than 0.1. Furthermore, the used oper-
ator consists of replacing a block of genes by its complementary, this latter
are generally of length one.
P1 = 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 → P
′
1 = 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
Figure 4. Mutation operator.
Aspiring to improve the fitness of chromosomes in the current population
(including the offsprings produced in the previous steps) and accelerate the
search process before launching the selection operator, we apply a low-cost
improving heuristic that essentially withdraws a given number of chromo-
somes and then tempts to apply on each drawn chromosome corrections on
its genes in order to extract form it a better fitted chromosome, by bringing
chromosomes to a local optima, in case of a positive result, the produced
chromosomes will be added to the current population replacing the existing
parents. The following step is to select the chromosomes to maintain for
the next generation, in which they will serve as parents. Hence, this oper-
ator can be critical, since here, we select the chromosomes to survive and
potentially spread their genes in forthcoming generations. In contrast, we
consequently eliminate chromosomes qualified by the chosen operator as un-
adapted. We used two randomly chosen operators according to a probability
ps. To begin with, we employed the elitist selection, that consists to retain
the best fitted chromosomes for the next generation, this operator prevent
the loss of ”good” genes, in contrast, it can cause a premature convergence.
The other used operator is known as the roulette wheel selection, this latter
consists to associate for each chromosomes i a probability of selection pi
CRYPTANALYSIS OF MERKLE-HELLMAN CIPHER USING PGA 5
according to its fitness value fi. Moreover, we allocate for each chromosome
i a proportion of length pi in the segment [0, 1] (an angle of 2pipi in case of
circular representation), for that we use the Algorithm 1 below:
Algorithm 1
Input: Fitness values f1, . . . , fn
Output: Selection probabilities p1, . . . , pn
1: Calculate fmax := max
1≤i≤n
{ fi } ;
2: For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, fi := fmax − fi + 1;
3: For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, pi :=
fi∑n
j=0 fj
;
4: Return p1, . . . , pn.
Let P = {I1, I2, . . . , I7} a population (a set of chromosomes as defined
privously), and respectively their fitness evaluations f1 = 100, f2 = 50, f3 =
60, f4 = 160, f5 = 30, f6 = 40, f7 = 10, by applying the algorithm above we
obtained respectively the proportions p1 = 0.08, p2 = 0.115, p3 = 0.085, p4 =
0.15, p5 = 0.26, p6 = 0.16, p7 = 0.15; with which, we constructed the wheel
in Figure 5; after that, one ”random” positions in the wheel is generated
at a time to pinpoint a chromosome to be selected. For instance, the value
0.55 (and any value between 0.43 and 0.69) would select the chromosome I5.
Furthermore, there are many variants of this operator, we name the stochas-
tic universal selection (SUS) introduced by James Baker [4], this operator
selects simultaneously multiple chromosomes by choosing a given number of
equally spaced values, as it is shown in Figure 5, the spinners indicates to
select three chromosomes I3, I5, I7. This operator has an advantage over the
roulette wheel selection, in case we have a chromosome that dominates the
population (in terms of its proportion in the wheel), in which, the latter can
be selected excessively.
I5
I6
I7 I1
I4
I3
I2
0.0
0.08
0.195
0.28
0.43
0.69
0.85
Figure 5. Roulette wheel selection.
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As has been mentioned earlier, the selection operator is chosen according
to a given probability ps. In practice, we recommend the values in [0.25, 0.3]
as to set an equilibrium between a further exploitation of the current best
fitted chromosomes and diversification illustrated as the exploitation of po-
tential ”partially fitted” chromosomes, that is, by altering between elitist
and roulette wheel selection operators.
5. Cryptanalytsis scheme
Commonly, parallel computing is considered as a means to improve the
performance of programs that have high computational cost (reduces the
execution time), as in the process of solving a NP-hard problems, in which,
recourse is often made to metaheuristics. One of the most studied yet ef-
fective metaheuristics is the Genetic Algorithm (GA), the parallelization of
this latter is a technic that is used to deal with large instances, aiming not
only to reduce the computation time but also to improve the quality of solu-
tions, inducing higher effectiveness compared to sequential GAs, especially,
by the arrival of cooperative multi-search models. In this study, the intuitive
approach of parallelization is to carry out a search (attack) on each block sep-
arately; however, the employed approach is a distributed attack preformed
on each block and enhanced with a communication strategy among paral-
lel processing elements (PEs) known as the migration in PGA, where the
latter is established in order to provide a cooperation among parallel PEs.
However, since search elements have different objectives, the utilization of
the migration operator, which we will elaborate later, is justified as an ex-
ploitation of the sensibility of the trapdoor sequence. Let mi,mj ∈ {0, 1}
n
tow blocks plain information of length 2n and Φi is a function that operates
on the elements of a block i, where Φi(m) = ci (
∑
j bjxj)
−1, m ∈ {0, 1}n.
Since in practice, the obtained ciphered information ci can be colossal for
large instances, for instance, a one block ciphered information of length 64
usually exceeds 1020, hence, the function Φ is used to reduce the value of
ciphered informations to an approximated value in [0, 1]. In order to study
the sensibility of the public key, we construct a subset of chromosomes from
N(mi) the neighborhood of mi the optimal solution for block i and we com-
pare their fitness in different environments (i.e. fitness in each block attack);
in practice we used a set J ⊂ E = {m | 0 < d(m,mi) ≤ 3} ⊂ N(mi), with
d(x , y), x, y ∈ {0, 1}n is the Hamming distance between x and y, where the
set J is obtained by randomly applying one to three bit modification on mi;
we observe that:
∃m ∈ N(mi), |Φi(m)− Φj(mj)| < |Φi(m)− Φi(mi)|,
in other terms, a slight modification in a chromosome can change the envi-
ronment in which it adapts, confirming that we can extract a near optimal
solution for a certain block attack from other block’s current population,
moreover, it is quite possible even for the most adapted chromosomes to
induce adapted solutions for other environments.
On this basis, we can circumstantiate the importance of establishing a
communication link among GAs, illustrated as a migration operator that
consists of sending chromosomes that verify the migration condition from a
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population to another, through connections along all GAs. For each block
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} the attacking process is summarized in the Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Parallel Genetic Algorithm (block j)
Begin
Initialize the Number of Generations nb := 0;
Generate the initial population P 0j ;
Evaluate chromosomes in P 0j ;
while (Plain information mj not found) do
Select parents form P nbj and Apply the crossover operator
according to pc;
Apply the mutation operator according to pm;
Apply an improving heuristic;
Evaluate the chromosomes in P nbj ;
if (Migration condition is satisfied) then
Send the concerned chromosomes to their new population;
endif
if (Receiving chromosomes) then
Remove the ’worst’ chromosomes and replace them with the
received ones;
endif
Increment nb;
endwhile
Apply a selection operator chosen according to ps;
End
Regarding the migration operator we have chosen a state dependent op-
erator that operates as follows: we evaluate each chromosome in Pi the
current population of the block i according to their fitness in the rest of the
blocks {1, . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , k} and we compare each of them with the best
fitted chromosome in the current populations {P1, . . . , Pi−1, Pi+1, . . . , Pk}
(compared with the best solution in the current population which is not
necessarily the best found solution), in other words, let m ∈ {0, 1}n and
fi(m) = |ci −
∑n
j=1 bjx
i
j| the fitness function associated to the i
th block; we
verify for each bloc i ∈ {1, . . . , k} if there exists a chromosome m′ ∈ Pi that
satisfies :
∀m ∈ Pj , fj(m
′) < fj(m), j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , k},
then the chromosome m′ is sent to Pj the current population of the block j,
in which it will replace the ’worst’ chromosome in the recipient population.
However, regarding that the blocks has different objectives, the migration
operator is applied before the selection operator in order to exploit the
unfitted chromosomes risking to be removed in the process of selection.
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In Figure 6, we put forward a summation of the attacking scheme presented
in the previous sections.
Bloc 1 : c1 Bloc 2 : c2 bloc k : ck
Initialize P1 Initialize P2 Initialize Pk
GA1 GA2 GAk
Generation i1 Generation i2 Generation ik
Decrypt(c1) Decrypt(c2) Decrypt(ck)
Bloc 1: m1 Bloc 2: m2 Bloc k: mk
. . .
. . .
i1:=i1 + 1; i2:=i2 + 1; ik:=ik + 1;
No No NoYes Yes Yes
Figure 6. Summation of the cryptanalysis technique.
6. Computational results
In this section we present the numerical results we have obtained on the
cryptanalysis of the Merkel-Hellman cipher using the scheme presented in
the previous sections. The implementation was achieved using Java SE plat-
form, in which the parallelization is concretized via multithreading. All the
following experiments was conducted on a single machine including an Intel
i7-5600U CPU (2 cores and 2 logical cores per physical).
The following experiments consist of studying the impact of the parameters
variations on the scheme’s performances, while the concerned parameters
are: the population size, mutation probability pm, selection probability ps
and the heuristic’s number of iterations. We must point that in the ex-
perimentations, all the parallel attacks (GAs) are applied with the same
parameters values, anywise, the aim is to spot suitable parameters values
for a given key size n and study the effect of these parameters on the scheme.
To achieve this, in each experimentation we tested 100 random instances for
each key length, where all clear informations are coded in 8 bits printable
ASCII; however, all the obtained results are adduced according to different
key lengths n ∈ {8× i | 3 ≤ i ≤ 14}.
The following table summarizes the conducted experimentations in statisti-
cal results (minimum, maximum, median and average) according to different
key lengths, showing the execution time and the number of generations, for
successful attacks on a one and tow blocks ciphered text.
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n k
Execution time (ms) Number of generations
min max median average min max median average
24
1 11 4309 47 760 1 1498 14 258
2 12 3209 63 293 1 1283 9 84
32
1 25 855 281 367 5 341 111 129
2 31 4511 344 1060 6 1261 81 308
40
1 47 17530 890 1776 10 1958 128 321
2 141 20481 1384 2922 41 4233 291 507
48
1 125 46645 5039 7853 13 6388 487 1040
2 2261 39368 6766 8711 333 7386 932 1337
56
1 149 49926 7685 11724 16 7829 702 1077
2 515 35942 7462 9752 76 7519 1186 1764
64
1 140 82617 8827 13716 11 17385 950 2070
2 1964 77429 9480 17346 234 11341 739 1738
72
1 1412 1078663 37285 78302 80 6341 1213 2033
2 8412 116903 36016 42523 222 9835 1936 3168
80
1 1237 661800 71919 102075 90 54576 5893 8381
2 2970 392536 65405 87398 87 25908 4419 6084
88
1 790 278324 101874 139909 49 25558 5418 8385
2 2265 332563 128968 131283 149 27008 10061 10285
96
1 40435 1874332 220279 424788 3591 80321 10560 19542
2 33613 1114694 243148 337441 2343 65965 18254 23310
104
1 102788 1770714 739343 780345 1905 58271 17467 20447
2 161213 2032836 786615 846839 6070 90594 23771 31351
112
1 38357 2595738 1335045 1119082 1294 52353 23584 25471
2 27822 3695401 1356234 1308807 429 69124 24202 25427
TABLE 1. Summation of the experimentations.
We tested the proposed scheme against variations of k the number of blocks,
by running three instances of size k ∈ {3, 4, 5} of different key size (see Ta-
ble 2).
Execution time (ms) Nb. of generations
k 3 4 5 3 4 5
n = 32 2326 6895 9355 198 340 223
n = 40 18669 7592 19351 142 361 319
n = 48 18669 7592 19351 142 361 319
n = 56 2326 6895 9355 198 340 223
n = 64 18669 7592 19351 142 361 319
n = 72 30116 24249 35708 7091 1153 362
n = 80 27060 48024 77951 1496 2049 928
n = 88 89590 180732 307455 5486 3016 2681
n = 96 177154 97566 116490 11739 3567 656
TABLE 2. Performance of the PGA attack against the number of blocks.
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The aim of the following experiment is to observe the resemblance ratio
by comparing the best found solution to the plain information for either
successful and unsuccessful attacks. Table 3 shows the obtained resemblance
ratios for different kay lengths, where the used instances are of length 2 to
4 blocks and the execution time was limited at 1800 seconds.
Instance I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I9 I10 Avrage
n = 32 1 1 1 0,44 1 0.66 1 1 1 0.60 0.87
n = 40 1 1 1 1 1 0.43 1 1 0.42 0.50 0.84
n = 48 1 1 1 1 0.40 1 0.46 1 0.52 1 0.88
n = 56 1 1 0.63 0.66 0.59 1 1 0.52 1 1 0.84
n = 64 1 0.52 0.56 1 0.48 1 0.50 1 0.64 1 0.77
n = 72 0.72 1 1 0.67 1 0.95 0.72 0.43 1 0.65 0.81
n = 80 1 0.89 0.63 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 1 0.38 0.85
n = 88 1 0.65 0.56 0.75 1 1 0.58 1 0.53 1 0.81
n = 96 1 0.52 1 1 0.78 0.56 1 1 0.46 1 0.83
TABLE 3. Resemblance ratio for PGA Attack.
Tables 4 and 5 resumes the obtained results regarding the effect of the
population size and the mutation probability on the performance of the
scheme, adduced in the average execution time and their associated number
of generations required for a successful decryption.
Execution time (ms) Number of generations
Pop. size 20 40 80 100 200 20 40 80 100 200
n = 32 293 134 540 1228 1420 38 14 43 50 31
n = 40 1119 334 789 768 2278 159 24 47 28 64
n = 48 7726 5511 3671 2122 6854 664 497 122 99 49
n = 56 7230 8478 6775 11282 21717 677 465 433 520 399
n = 64 17692 6489 5128 28328 1212 245 196 519
n = 72 75397 64266 26726 29117 3206 1603 832 647
n = 80 86263 56250 16937 33820 3760 2295 441 343
n = 88 150157 80850 110573 4966 891 1571
n = 96 260523 270235 161947 9483 7991 4655
n = 102 97101 778023 57194 29132
n = 112 1883678 1508266 32847 23561
TABLE 4. Effect of the population size.
Table 6 shows the results related to a conducted experiment aiming to
observe the effect of the selection operator. For this purpose, we use ps the
probability that determines the selection operator in each iteration of the
algorithm among the roulette wheel selection and the elitist selection, since
these operators has a major impact on the evolution of the algorithm, and
yet on the quality of the results and its execution time.
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Execution time (ms) Nb. of generations
pm 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.01 0.1 0.2
n = 56 2326 6895 9355 198 340 223
n = 64 18669 7592 19351 142 361 319
n = 72 30116 24249 35708 7091 1153 362
n = 80 27060 48024 77951 1496 2049 928
n = 88 177154 97566 116490 11739 3567 656
n = 96 89590 180732 307455 5486 3016 2681
n = 104 163024 446651 1085037 9483 8129 11118
n = 112 1401182 1269385 1834316 28560 27352 33792
TABLE 5. Effect of the mutation probability.
Execution time (ms) Nb. of generations
ps 0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1 0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1
n = 56 13356 7050 705 2202 1975 554 263 22 63 111
n = 64 36911 28108 41457 21429 31751 2396 1635 423 353 2060
n = 72 53259 46138 28328 24080 55448 2396 1635 423 353 2060
n = 80 71585 62400 124252 81368 107396 2023 2539 2033 1797 2627
n = 88 144173 93195 165704 127010 247476 4829 3651 6637 6051 4316
n = 96 619685 142769 244599 198579 233760 11154 3404 2302 2025 1806
n = 104 793287 269490 418359 280378 896040 5669 3577 4186 2609 9149
n = 112 3695401 908263 1530486 1408183 2202185 69124 1435 24821 28674 21263
TABLE 6. The impact of ps variations on the scheme’s preference.
As it is mentioned in Section 4, an improving heuristic has been inte-
grated in the GA search process, therefore, we’ve conducted an experiment
aiming to observe the effect of the heuristic’s parameter on the scheme’s per-
formance. For this, we fixed the number of chromosomes that goes through
the heuristic in each GA iteration to one third of the current population size
(pop.size3 ), where these chromosomes are selected randomly from the current
population. The experiment consists of variating the heuristic’s number of
iterations, the following table shows the obtained results for different values
(nb.iter ∈ {i× 100|1 ≤ i ≤ 5}).
Execution time (ms) Nb. of generations
Nb.iter 100 200 300 400 500 100 200 300 400 500
n = 40 1016 971 1659 6873 5419 142 107 172 496 274
n = 48 5445 2684 840 566 1840 967 178 75 31 70
n = 56 8626 6306 5171 6876 3396 1393 582 359 312 65
n = 64 13315 7651 1860 3118 6945 1958 901 204 176 273
n = 72 36068 40622 35194 21331 16239 4377 4093 1581 1016 382
n = 80 97361 193045 267799 123560 149724 5832 20946 22451 7637 10992
n = 88 179386 119915 107090 142648 203428 9410 15788 6761 10487 15331
n = 96 387153 328411 684342 239163 168334 37303 24743 40261 11541 18673
n = 104 929999 450031 529709 757108 846461 47277 14494 13075 23874 20434
n = 112 1833462 1938746 797602 896392 1412702 33235 47957 46811 61963 42144
TABLE 7. The effect of the heuristic number of iterations.
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Comparison with the LLL algorithm. As it is mentioned in the in-
troduction, lattice reduction attack was proposed in [19], using the LLL
algorithm, prsented in [8] by Lenstra, Lenstra and Lova´sz. Analogous to our
propsed scheme, this method can also be viewed as a form of heuristic search
[14]. We present a comparison with the LLL reduction attack, by running
instances (public key {bi}1≤i≤n , clear inforamation m and its associated
ciphered information c), identified by the the paramaters n, δ and p, where,
n is the public key size, δ the density of the knapsack (public key) [16], and
p is the proportion of ones in the clear information m;
δ =
n
log2 max
1≤i≤n
bi
, p =
∑
i xi
n
·
Furthermore, throughout this expirement, we used two lattice bases, the
Lagarias-Odlyzko basis [17], and Coster, Joux, LaMacchia, Odlyzko, Schnorr,
and Stern (CJLOSS) basis [18]. For this expirementation, we used the
SageMath function for LLL algorithm [20], [15]. Table 8 an 9 present
the results of comparison between the LLL-based attack and the proposed
scheme, obtained by running respectively: 50 instances per density value
and 44 instances. The aim of the following experiment is to observe the per-
formance of the proposed scheme against the variation public key density.
δ Proposed scheme LLL reduction
[0.6, 0.7[ 0.648 0.420
[0.7, 0.8[ 0.583 0.25
[0.8, 0.9[ 0.521 0.271
[0.9, 1.0[ 0.632 0.183
TABLE 8. Success ratios of LLLreduction and the proposed scheme.
Throughout the comparison, the LLL algorithm attack has shown lower
computational cost than the proposed scheme, which is induced by its dif-
ferences in data processing approaches and its objectives, which have an
important influence on the results quality. In contrast, the success ratio of
LLL algorithm is 29%, while the proposed scheme has a success ratio of
60%, attaining a significant difference of 31%.
Results discussion and comments.
• The results in Table 1 shows a minor difference in both average
and median decryption time among attacks on one and tow blocks,
which, illustrates the efficiency of the proposed parallel approach,
even for large instances.
• Only the parameter’s values that manifest consistency has been in-
cluded in the previous tables, which explains the blank cells in Ta-
ble 4.
CRYPTANALYSIS OF MERKLE-HELLMAN CIPHER USING PGA 13
Instance Cryptanalysis method
n δ p Proposed scheme LLL reduction
32
0.627 0.375 ✓ ✓
0.711 0.343 ✓ ✗
0.842 0.406 ✗ ✗
0.914 0.250 ✓ ✓
40
0.634 0.634 ✓ ✗
0.769 0.525 ✓ ✗
0.869 0,425 ✓ ✓
0.930 0.500 ✓ ✗
48
0.648 0,416 ✓ ✓
0.716 0,625 ✓ ✓
0.800 0,479 ✗ ✗
0.906 0.542 ✓ ✗
56
0.651 0,268 ✗ ✗
0.778 0,500 ✗ ✓
0.875 0,464 ✓ ✗
0.933 0,267 ✓ ✗
64
0.680 0,250 ✓ ✓
0.753 0.531 ✓ ✗
0.878 0.266 ✓ ✓
0.941 0.438 ✗ ✗
72
0.637 0.486 ✓ ✗
0.758 0.208 ✗ ✗
0.878 0.472 ✓ ✗
0.941 0.458 ✓ ✗
80
0.620 0.187 ✓ ✗
0.721 0.412 ✗ ✗
0.889 0.275 ✗ ✗
0.963 0.475 ✗ ✗
88
0.651 0.443 ✗ ✗
0.745 0.50 ✓ ✗
0.862 0.420 ✗ ✗
0.977 0.454 ✓ ✗
96
0.676 0.218 ✓ ✗
0.701 0.395 ✗ ✓
0.857 0.427 ✓ ✓
0.969 0.468 ✗ ✗
104
0.630 0.519 ✓ ✗
0.717 0.298 ✓ ✓
0.838 0.279 ✗ ✗
0.981 0.403 ✓ ✗
112
0.674 0.473 ✓ ✗
0.770 0.519 ✓ ✓
0.854 0.375 ✗ ✗
0.971 0.384 ✓ ✗
TABLE 9. Comparison between LLL reduction and the proposed scheme.
(The symbols ✓ and ✗ respectively refer to successful and unsuccessful attacks)
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• The scheme’s performance has shown a considerable sensibility to-
wards the parameters pm and ps (see Tables 5 and 6). Regarding
the selection operator the recommended value as to set the required
equilibrium is ps ≈ 0.3, which gives the elitist selection operator the
preponderance; while according to the experimentations, the suit-
able value for pm ≈ 0.1.
• The integrated heuristic has an important role in the global opti-
mization process (decryption), nevertheless, as it is shown in Ta-
ble 7, an overloaded heuristic can cause delayance in the process of
decryption, in other words, the cost of the local optimization can
emerge, in case of an encumbered parameters.
• Regarding that the LLL algorithm is known to be effective against
low density knapsack problem, according to the results in Table 8
and 9, the proposed scheme shows no significant sensibility towards
the knapsack density δ.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we present cryptanalysis scheme based on the genetic algo-
rithm, adapted to break the Merkle-Hellman cipher; regarding that in this
latter a clear information is ciphered in blocks, the attacking approach is
essentially an adapted parallelization of multiple genetic algorithms, aiming
to decrypt a ciphered information in full. Furthermore, the scheme is en-
hanced with a deliberated cooperation among the search entities (GAs) via
the migration operator, although each GA has a distinct target solution (sin-
gle block clear information), we show that the migration of solutions can be
useful under a given condition. Finally, we concluded this paper with some
experimental results illustrating the scheme’s performance in regards to its
parameters.
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